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I. INTRODUCTION
Studies and polls began revealing the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace in the mid-1970s.' Despite Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which prohibits discrimination in the
workplace, sexual harassment itself was not recognized as a legal
cause of action until 1976.' Even then, the topic did not receive
substantial public attention until the highly publicized confirma-
tion hearings ofJustice Clarence Thomas in October 1991.
4
For the past several years, sexual harassment issues and result-
ing litigation have been a topic of widespread publicity and re-
search. Enhanced awareness of sexual harassment issues has made
it more likely that victims will seek legal recourse. However, a diffi-
6cult trial process often deters victims from doing so. In sexual
1. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 821-22 (1991) (citing
surveys finding that 36 to 53 percent of women questioned regard themselves to
have been victims of sexual harassment); see also U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD OFFICE OF POLICY AND EVALUATION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 16 (1988) (finding that among federal employees, 14%
of males and 42% females complained of being sexually harassed); 1 ALBA CONTE,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE §1.1 (1994) (citing
similar survey findings); see generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (calling
attention to the plight of working women). MacKinnon discusses the pervasive-
ness of sexual harassment in the workplace, citing several studies conducted dur-
ing the 1970s, including a REDBOOK magazine poll in which nine out of ten
women reported experiences of sexual harassment at work. See id. at 26-29 (citing
Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Harassment,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994)).
3. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub. nom. on
other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Estrich, supra
note 1, at 861 n.22; MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 63-65.
4. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Sexual Harassment: About Power, Not Lust, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at Cl; Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 AKRON L. REv. 269, 270 (1996).
5. See Roberts & Mann, supra note 4, at 269 n.4 (citing a database containing
more than 6500 articles from thirty leading newspapers referencing "sexual har-
assment" since 1989); see also Pamela Kruger, See No Evil, WORKING WOMAN, June
1995, at 33 (citing a study showing over one-third of Fortune 500 companies have
faced sexual harassment suits in recent years); Sexual Harassment in the Fed. Gov't:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Serv., 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (requesting that the Merit Systems Protection
Board conduct a study on the scope of sexual harassment in federal employment,
and that the EEOC make improvements to its processing of sexual harassment
complaints).
6. See, e.g., Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering The Myth: Mediating Sexual Har-
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harassment cases, the victim is forced to replay the traumatizing
events during the discovery process, and again, before the judge or
jury.7 In addition, the case is often a matter of balancing the vic-
tim's word against the harasser's, a match-up that rarely favors the
victim.'
Plaintiffs have found the litigation process more attractive fol-
lowing the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act)9
and the extension of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidencel ° to
civil cases." Reflecting these developments, the number of sexual
harassment cases filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) 12 and federal and state courts has continued
assment Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2489, 2504 (1997) (discussing
the difficulties of the trial process for sexual harassment victims); Ellen E. Schultz
&Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs Sex Lives Are Being Laid Bare in Harassment
Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al (discussing the areas of a plaintiff's past
which are open to scrutiny and exploitation by defense attorneys).
7. See Bond, supra note 6, at 2504-05 (stating that "[b]leing harassed is emo-
tionally distressing, but replaying it in front of a judge or jury in public may be
even more traumatizing").
8. See id. at 2505-06.
9. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at various sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (1994)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains pro-
visions for both compensatory and punitive damages for victims of sexual harass-
ment in addition to those remedies already authorized under section 7 06(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id.
10. FED. R. EVID. 412, as amended, effective Dec. 1, 1994.
11. See id. Previously Rule 412, the federal rape-shield rule, prevented abuse
of the unwelcomeness standard in criminal cases by barring admission of a plain-
tiffs past sexual history unless it was constitutionally required. See text of former
FED. R. EVID. 412 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. F.R.E. 412 (1988)). The intent of the
new Rule is to curb harassing inquiries into the sexual history of sexual harassment
victims. See FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's notes. Although the recent
amendment may reduce the use of this information, the plaintiffs past sexual his-
tory is still admissible as far as specific acts showing intent of invitation to or
provocation of the alleged harassment. See id.; see also Paul Nicholas Monnin,
Note, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual
Harassment Claims after the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1155, 1169-77 (1995) (discussing motivations behind the Judicial Confer-
ence amendments to Rule 412).
12. The EEOC is the federal administrative body charged with enforcing Title
VII and the ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 20003-5(a) & 20003-16(b) (1994); see also Su-
san K. Grebeldinger, The Role of Workplace Hostility in Determining Prospective Remedies
in Employment Discrimination: A Call For Greater Judicial Discretion in Awarding Front
Pay, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 319, 325 (1996) (describing EEOC enforcement and
policies). An employee must exhaust the EEOC administrative remedies as a pre-
requisite to filing a Title VII lawsuit. See E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products
Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
3
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to increase rapidly." However, statistics show that the percentage
of sexual harassment incidents actually reported is still very low.
14
In addition to this increase, sexual harassment cases have
changed in focus. Early litigation under Title VII centered first on
defining sexual harassment as a Title VII violation. 15 Later, the fo-
cus shifted to procedural problems and establishment of the ele-
ments constituting substantive violations.16  Litigation then pro-
gressed into what has been termed the "recovery stage" of the
proceedings. 7 The recovery stage focuses on resolving the issues of
damages when the court has determined that a wrong has oc-
curred . In such cases, the courts typically struggle to fashion the
most appropriate remedy possible within the stated and implied ob-
jectives and limits of Title VII. 9
Sexual harassment plaintiffs face monumental obstacles in this
stage of litigation as well.' ° Not only is the plaintiff unduly hin-
dered from commencing a suit, but once involved in litigation, the
sexual harassment plaintiff must establish additional elements of
21proof, which are not required in other types of Title VII litigation.
Even those successful in sexual harassment litigation still face an
uphill battle in receiving the full range of remedies available under
13. See ROBERTS & MANN, supra note 4, at 272 (citing studies that reported a
jump of 69% in claims from 1991 to 1992 and 13% from 1993 to 1994). The in-
crease in sexual harassment and other workplace discrimination cases led some
commentators to term employment litigation as a "growth industry of the 1980's."
ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPuTES WITHOUT
LITIGATION 1 (1988).
14. See Hearings on H.. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong. 172 (1991) (statement of Dr. Freada Klein)
(indicating that more than 90% of sexual harassment victims still refrain from re-
porting).
15. See infra notes 23-77 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (estab-
lishing the order and allocation of proof and production burdens); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (defining the perimeters for testing as a means of
making hiring and promotion decisions).
17. See Gregg N. Grimsley, Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND. L. REv. 211 (1976) (focusing on attempts to
"make whole' Title VII plaintiffs).
18. SeeJohnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (56 Cir.
1974). The Johnson court described the recovery phase as a "thorny path" in which
courts would need to carefully consider the "historical facts, emotional claims, and
biased contentions.., in a heated contest dominated by financial considerations."
Id.
19. See infra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 191-228 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
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22
the law. Prevailing stereotypes and the judicial preference for re-
instatement may prevent the victim from receiving the complete re-
lief mandated by Title VII.
Part II of this article explores the development of sexual har-
assment as a cause of action under Title VII. It highlights the
prejudices that delayed the acceptance of sexual harassment as a
legitimate complaint and that continue to limit the award of avail-
able remedies. Part III discusses the recovery phase of Title VII liti-
gation and examines Congress' goals in granting the courts broad
discretion to determine appropriate remedies to victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination. Part IV offers front pay as an important element
of the remedial scheme necessary to achieve the objectives of Title
VII. Specifically, it notes the advantages of front pay, both as a
complement to back pay and as an alternative to reinstatement. It
further examines the concerns that have limited the use of front
pay and focuses on the need for increased acceptance of front pay
as a remedy for sexual harassment cases under Title VII. Part V
concludes that, in keeping with the ever-evolving nature of sexual
harassment litigation, the courts should afford front pay equal con-
sideration as an available prospective remedy for victims of sexual
harassment.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A LEGAL CLAIM
A. Legislative History
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 bars discrimination by
employers against employees on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin.' Title VII was passed to ensure equal op-
2-5portunity by removing artificial barriers to employment. Section
704 of Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees who file complaints under Title VII.
2 6
Section 703 (a) (1) of Title VII explicitly prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in conditions of employment. Sexual harassment, however,
22. See infra notes 191-228 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to-17 (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
25. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994); see also 1 CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.1 (de-
lineating the scope of Title VII proscriptions).
5
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is not expressly mentioned.2 7 Thus, the development of sexual har-
assment as a Title VII violation has suffered from a want of precise
28statutory mooring. In addition, the prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion, sexual harassment's link to Title VII, is exceptional in that vir-
tually no legislative history exists to guide the courts in interpreting
its intended scope.2 This dilemma was created, in part, by the ad-
dition of the word "sex" to Title VII by a last minute floor amend-
ment.3° The addition of sex as a protected category was apparently
a final effort by opponents to defeat the passage of the Act. How-
ever, the plan backfired when female representatives, who might
otherwise have opposed the Act's passage, flocked to support it.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII prohibits discrimination because
of an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
28. See infra notes 34-77 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("[W]e are
left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on 'sex'"); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("Virtually no legislative history provides guidance to courts interpret-
ing the prohibition of sex discrimination"); see generally Francis J. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv. 431 (1965).
30. The bill originally considered by Congress and debated in committee
prohibited discrimination in the workplace only on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2392; see also 110 CONG. REC. 2577-82, 2851 (1964); Miranda
Oshige, What's Sex Got ToDo with It?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 565, 566 (1995) (noting that
the prohibition against sex discrimination was added as a last-minute amendment,
resulting in a lack of guidance as to the contours of sex discrimination in the
workplace); Vaas, supra note 29, at 44142 (discussing the short House debate on
the addition of sex to the protected categories).
31. See Paul C. Sweeney, Abuse, Misuse & Abrogation of the Use of Legislative His-
tory: Title IX and Peer Sexual Harassment, 66 U.M.KC. L. REv. 41, 86 (1997). Repre-
sentative Howard Smith of Virginia, a staunch opponent of civil rights, offered the
floor amendment. See id. See also Vaas, supra note 29, at 441-42; 110 CONG. REc.
2577-82, 2851 (1964); 1 CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.1. Representative Smith offered
the amendment in a satirical, almost malicious spirit, having offered similar
amendments in other sections of the bill that were defeated. See Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 676-77 (noting that Representative Smith alleged a sex-
ual imbalance in the population was depriving women of a right to be husbands).
The fact that every man supporting the amendment ultimately voted against the
House bill, also brings into question the seriousness of the amendment as an at-
tempt by its supporters to truly guarantee equal employment opportunities for
women. See id.; 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964).
32. See Vaas, supra note 29, at 442; 110 CONG. REc. 2577, 2578-83 (1964). De-
spite the strong support by many Congresswomen, some key women opposed the
amendment, fearing that it might be used to destroy the overall bill, and stressing
the need to deal with the unique problems of sex discrimination separately. See
Vaas, supra note 29, at 442; 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
[Vol. 24
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The result was a sex-based protection for workers that was loosely
defined and unsupported by documentation of congressional in-
tent, leaving the EEOC and the federal courts with the burden of
determining viable principles to aid in interpreting the scope of Ti-
tle VII protection.
B. Early Cases: Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination
The 1972 amendments to Title VII provided some clarification
of Congressional intent to eliminate sexual discrimination through
Title VII.3 Yet, the courts still struggled to find a cause of action
15for sexual harassment claims. This struggle seemed to stem, at
least in part, from the idea that sexual harassment was a personal,
36rather than a social issue. In addition, early courts feared that al-
lowing sexual harassment claims under Title VII would prompt a
flood of litigation consisting of false and unnecessary claims.37 Re-
jecting this notion, feminist advocates continued to push for a shift
in the paradigm to regard sexual harassment as a form of sex dis-
crimination, recognized by the law."8
Despite these efforts, it was not until 1976 that a federal district
33. See Oshige, supra note 30, at 566.
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (1994)).
35. Seel CoNTE, supra note 1, § 2.1.
36. Topics of a sexual nature were generally considered sensitive and private,
and early cases demonstrated the common view that sexual advances in the work-
place were merely a manifestation of personal attractions, proclivities and manner-
isms. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (sug-
gesting that courts should refrain from delving into matters regarding the natural
sex phenomenon of attraction between the sexes), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975) (stating that the supervisor's sexual advances arose from his own personal
urges), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 694 (1997)
(recognizing the work of feminists to set aside the notion that "sexual harassment
was a private, interpersonal kind of sexual mischief"); MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
27 (noting the sensitive, private nature of sexual subjects).
37. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556
(D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236;
Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
38. See generally MAcKINNON, supra note 1 (framing sexual harassment as a
problem of sex-based power); CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976)
(stating that harassment, in any form, is an attempt by the harasser to maintain a
competitive advantage in the workplace); Franke, supra note 36, at 694, 698 (dis-
cussing the role of feminist theorists and litigators in bringing to light the view
that sex harassment is a species of sex discrimination).
7
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court first held that sexually harassing conduct constituted dis-
criminatory treatment within the meaning of Tide VII.s' The early
cases provided a legal definition for unwanted sexual behavior in
the workplace, but required that the plaintiff demonstrate a tangi-
ble job detriment in connection with the harassment in order to
40 41gain judicial relief. In the first recorded case, Williams v. Saxbe,
the D.C. Circuit court recognized that the retaliation suffered by
the plaintiff was a result of discrimination based on her sex, and
thus violated Tide VII.42 The court held that the conduct of the
plaintiff's supervisor "created an artificial barrier to employment
which was placed before one gender and not the other, despite the
fact that both genders are similarly situated in the workplace.
The Williams decision was followed by Barnes v. Costle," in
which the court found a violation of Title VII when the plaintiff's
job was abolished after she refused a supervisor's sexual advances. 45
The Barnes court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the
plaintiff was discriminated against because she refused her supervi-
sor's sexual advances, not because she was a woman. 4 Rather, the
court found that "gender was an indispensible [sic] factor in the
job-retention condition" faced by the plaintiff.47 The Barnes court
furthered clarified how the conditioning of a tangible job benefit
39. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub. nom. on
other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The plaintiff estab-
lished that her former employer, the Justice Department, discharged her in re-
taliation for refusing a sexual advance from her immediate supervisor. See id. at
655-57.
40. See ANJA ANGELICA CHAN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A PRACrICAL
GUIDE TO THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE HOsTILE ENVIRONMENT
CLAIM 3-4 (1994) (discussing the development of sexual harassment as a cause of
action under Title VII).
41. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds, Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
42. See id. at 657-59; see also CHAN, supra note 40, at 4.
43. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 659.
44. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Barnes, the plaintiff claimed that, de-
spite her repeated refusals, her supervisor made numerous sexual remarks and
offers for after-work social activities and suggested that her employment status
would be enhanced if she cooperated with his advances. See id. at 985. When the
plaintiff definitively refused the supervisor's sexual advances, the supervisor belit-
ded her, stripped her of herjob duties and ultimately abolished herjob. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 990.
47. Id. at 992. The court stated that gender would not have been an indis-
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on sexual favors came under the definition of sex discrimination by
noting that, "but for his or her sex" the employee would not have
faced the discriminatory treatment.48
These cases signaled the beginning of the acceptance of sexual
harassment as a Title VII action. However, the courts remained
hesitant to accept the notion that sexual harassment constituted
sex discrimination.4 9 It was clear that the courts did not yet fully
understand the ramifications of sexual harassment in the work-
place. 50 Nearly another decade passed before the courts recog-
nized that sexual harassment without a tangible job detriment of an
economic character was also a violation of Title VII.
51
C. The EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC is an independent, bipartisan commission estab-
lished by Tide VII.52 The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII,
and it has the power to issue regulations concerning claims under
Title VII. 53 Prompted by confusion surrounding sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII following cases such
as Williams and Barnes, the EEOC issued guidelines providing a• • 54
framework for analyzing sexual harassment claims. These guide-
lines, issued in 1980, 5 define conduct that constitutes an actionable
claim for sex discrimination and affirm the EEOC position that
sexual harassment in employment violates Title VII. The EEOC
48. Id. at 990 n.55.
49. See 1 CONTE, supra note 1, §§ 2.1, 2.5.
50. See CHAN, supra note 40, at 4 (explaining that even after Williams, women
who suffered from sexual harassment were denied relief unless they could demon-
strate a tangible job detriment); Franke, supra note 36, at 698 (noting that courts
trivialized the effects of sexual harassment as merely an inescapable result of the
workplace becoming sexually integrated).
51. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (recognizing a
cognizable claim under Title VII without a detriment to a tangible job benefit). In
1981, the D.C. Circuit Court recognized that discrimination with respect to "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment could be found in a "substantially dis-
criminatory work environment" regardless of whether any tangible job benefit was
affected. See Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
52. See ARTHUR GTMAN, EEO LAw & PERsONNEL PRACrICES 7 (1993).
53. See id. The EEOC also enforces the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, a portion of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See id.
54. Seel CoNTE, supra note 1, § 2.1.
55. See 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
56. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1997) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. The
EEOC Guidelines on sex discrimination provide that:
9
Papacek: Sexual Harassment and the Struggle for Equal Treatment under Titl
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WLL/AM MITCHELL LA W REVEW
Guidelines recognize that an employer does not have to threaten
an individual's employment directly in order for the terms and
conditions of employment to be discriminatory.57 The EEOC
Guidelines provide a broad definition of sexual harassment and ex-
tend the scope of liability for the harassing conduct.58 The EEOC
also advises the courts to consider the totality of the circumstances
in determining whether the conduct in question constitutes sexual
harassment.
59
While EEOC rulings, interpretations, and opinions are not
binding on federal courts, the Supreme Court recognized that
EEOC actions "do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. "60 These guidelines, and the subsequent application of
the regulations by the courts, encouraged victims of sexual harass-
ment to come forward in far greater numbers than had previously
been recorded.61 Thus, the EEOC Guidelines were extremely im-
portant in the process of legitimizing sexual harassment as a social
and legal issue.62  However, not all courts accepted the EEOC
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
Id.
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997); see also Oshige, supra note 30, at 572 (stat-
ing that, "in many ways, the EEOC guidelines expanded the basis for employment
discrimination claims").
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997); see also 1 CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.8.
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1997); see also 1 CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.8.
60. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (citing Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
61. See I CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.8. In 1981, the year following the issuance
of the EEOC Guidelines, the number of sexual harassment complaints filed with
the EEOC climbed to 3,812, from 75 in 1980. See id. Also in 1981, the D.C. Circuit
court endorsed the EEOC definition of sexual harassment without loss of a tangi-
ble job benefit as an actionable claim. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding sexual harassment where sexual intimidation was a
.normal condition of employment").
62. See 1 CONTE, supra note 1, § 2.1; see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment
Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66, 115-16 (1995). The author
notes that the EEOC Guidelines were highly controversial when proposed, with
some critics fearing that employers would be burdened with trivial charges. See id.
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framework, and the standards of liability in sexual harassment cases
continued to be applied inconsistently.
D. Supreme Court Definition
Finally, in 1986 the United States Supreme Court decided its
first sexual harassment case in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.64 In
this landmark decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
sexual behavior directed at terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by the lan-
guage of Title VII because it infers that harassment is based on the
victim's sex. The Court thus ratified the approach of the EEOC
65and some lower courts.
The Meritor Court echoed the EEOC Guidelines and recog-
nized two legal grounds for sexual harassment claims under TitleS66
VII: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment.
Under quid pro quo harassment, a person of authority conditions
employment or advancement on acquiescence to a sexual de-67
mand. By definition, quid pro quo sexual harassment involves the
However, the guidelines were soon heavily relied on by the courts and became
widely accepted. See id.
63. See 1 CoNTE, supra note 1, §§ 2.1, 2.8. Most courts agreed that employers
should be vicariously liable in quid pro quo harassment cases, but courts split on
whether employer knowledge was required to impose liability in hostile work envi-
ronment cases. See id. § 2.9; see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (re-
quiring employer notice of harassing conduct in order to impose liability); Craig v.
Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that actual knowledge at
the time of the employment decision is sufficient); Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (imposing absolute liability), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755
F.2d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 1983) (imposing strict liability).
64. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
65. See id. at 64-65 (recognizing hostile environment claim of sexual harass-
ment as actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII). The Meritor Court cited
both the EEOC Guidelines and the Eleventh Circuit decision in Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (l1th Cir. 1982) as support for hostile work environ-
ment claims. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
879 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for sexual
harassment when "she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment"); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845
F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that prima facie case for sex discrimination
can be established by showing a pattern of sexual harassment that subjects the
employee to disparate treatment discrimination with respect to a term, condition,
or privilege of employment).
66. See Meitor, 477 U.S. at 65; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1997).
67. See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no
11
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express or implied threat of loss of a tangible employment bene-
fit.
The other possible ground for sexual harassment claims rec-
ognizes allegations that the employee had to endure a hostile work
environment.69  Hostile work environment claims arise when har-
assing conduct is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the con-
ditions of [the plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive work-.,,,70 
7
ing environment. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,71 the Supreme
quid pro quo when alleged threats of adverse job consequences were not carried
out); Ellert v. University of Tex., at Dallas, 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Any
employer requiring sexual favors from an employee as a quid pro quo for bestowing
job benefits upon that employee violates Title VII"); Henson, 682 F.2d at 909 (set-
ting forth the elements of quid pro quo sexual harassment); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding a Title VII
violation when a supervisor conditioned a subordinate's status on a favorable re-
sponse to his sexual advances); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.D.C.
1976) (finding sexual harassment under Title VII on quid pro quo grounds); 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1997). As enumerated in Henson, the elements of
proof required to establish quid pro quo harassment are: (1) membership in a
protected class; (2) subjection to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harass-
ment was based upon sex; (4) the employee's reaction to the harassment affected
a tangible term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropri-
ate remedial action. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
68. See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omit-
ted) (the gravamen of the quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job benefit is con-
ditioned on the submission to sexual advances); Ellert, 52 F.3d at 543 (dismissing
sexual harassment claim where plaintiff was unable to show her termination was a
result of her rejecting a supervisor's advances); Henson, 682 F.2d at 912-13 (grant-
ing plaintiff a new trial to determine whether her refusal of sexual advances led to
denial of promotional training opportunities); Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (find-
ing Title VII violation where refusal of sexual favors led to demotion and ulti-
mately termination); Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 663 (retaliation by supervisor, result-
ing in plaintiff's termination, after refusing a supervisor's sexual advance
constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2)
(1997).
69. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993) (discussing a
hostile work environment claim); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (recognizing a claim for
hostile work environment); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (recognizing that a discrimina-
tory work environment affects a "term, condition, or privilege of employment");
Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding a Title VII viola-
tion where the work environment was substantially discriminatory, regardless of
whether any tangible job benefit was lost).
70. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904); see also Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff need not show
concrete psychological harm to show that an environment is abusive); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the determination of
whether a work environment is hostile must be made from the plaintiffs perspec-
tive). Hostile work environment claims were rooted in similar claims for discrimi-
nation based on a workplace "heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
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Court attempted to define what constitutes a hostile or abusive
work environment.2 The Court, in reviewing the totality of the cir-
cumstances, listed several factors relevant to determining whether
an environment is hostile or abusive, but did not specifically re-
quire the presence of any single factor.73 These factors include "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance"; and any psychological harm to the employee.74
While not a precise test, the courts are guided by these factors to
determine whether the conduct is merely vulgar or offensive, and
not necessarily behavior constituting a Title VII violation. 75
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, immediately recog-
76
nized the difficulties with this vague standard. The courts have
legitimized Justice Scalia's concern, displaying difficulty in applying
the standard, which takes into account both subjective and objec-
77tive factors, to sexual harassment cases.
Thus, the judiciary began to recognize that sexual harassment
must be given a legitimate legal foundation to meet the goal of the
Title VII sexual discrimination text.78 Yet, vague and contradictory
standards used to evaluate the merits of a sexual harassment case
tion." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting Congress's in-
tent to "eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of... discrimi-
nation" through Title VII).
71. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
72. See id. at 21-22.
73. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the vague standard
provided by the majority was "faithful to the inherently vague statutory language"
of Title VII).
77. See Edward Cerasia II, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: An Objective Standard,
But Whose Perspective?, 10 LAB. LAw. 253, 265 (1994) (stating that the emphasis on
case-by-case analysis will serve to "muddy the waters"). The Harris Court estab-
lished a two-prong test for evaluating a hostile environment claim: 1) an objective
standard (i.e. whether a "reasonable person" would find the environment hostile
or abusive); and 2) a subjective standard (i.e. whether the plaintiff can show that
she actually perceived the environment to be hostile or abusive). See Harris, 510
U.S. at 20-21. However, decisions following Harris have struggled with determin-
ing from whose perspective to view the objective standard. See Cerasia, supra, at
265.
78. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
recognized that Title VII focuses on instances where members of one sex are ex-
posed to disadvantages in terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed. See id.
13
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remain hurdles that a plaintiff must surmount.
E. Additional Requirements: Welcomeness and Motive
It is now clear that victims of sexual harassment have redress
under Title VII. However, the process of presenting a viable case is
still onerous. In addition to establishing a prima facie case, 79 the
plaintiff also faces additional elements of welcomeness and motive.
1. Welcomeness
A plaintiff in a sexual harassment case must show that the con-
duct complained of was "unwelcome."'0 No such requirement is
imposed upon plaintiffs claiming other forms of discriminatory
harassment, which presume that the harassing conduct is unwel-
come.8 ' The courts and the EEOC have legitimized the imposition
of this additional element by emphasizing the fact that sexually-
oriented exchanges between two adults are often reciprocal and
welcome. 2
Unfortunately, the courts have been unable to clearly define
83the criteria to prove that the conduct was unwelcome. The judi-
79. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05, 909-911 (11th Cir.
1982). The Henson court articulated the elements of a sexual harassment claim as:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) subjection to unwelcome sexual harass-
ment; (3) the harassment was based upon sex; (4) the employee's reaction to the
harassment affected a tangible term, condition or privilege of employment; and
(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt and appropriate remedial action. See id.
80. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The grava-
men of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'un-
welcome'") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). Section 1604.11(a) provides that
"[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct... constitute sexual harassment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1997).
See also Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (relying on the EEOC guidelines to define unwel-
come sexual conduct); Monnin, supra note 11, at 1160-66 (discussing the devel-
opment of the unwelcomeness requirement).
81. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 135 (1992) (noting that the unwelcomeness requirement is
unique to sexual harassment); Monnin, supra note 11, at 1160-66.
82. See Brief for the United States and Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (No. 84-1979) ("Whereas racial slurs are intrinsically offensive and pre-
sumptively unwelcome, sexual advances and innuendo are ambiguous: depending
on their context, they may be intended by the initiator, and perceived by the re-
cipient, as denigrating or complimentary, as threatening or welcome, as malevo-
lent or innocuous").
83. See Monnin, supra note 11, at 1165 (noting that, although the majority of
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cial struggle to apply the objective and subjective standards, previ-
ously discussed,8 is pronounced in the welcomeness determina-
tion,8 ' as courts also disagree on the proper perspective from which
to view the standard.8' This issue of perspective in viewing hostility
and welcomeness in sexual harassment cases is problematic, in that
both have potential pitfalls. Applying the objective reasonable per-
son standard may ignore very real differences in perception be-
tween men and women.87 On the other hand, use of the reason-
able woman standard may work to further entrench a stereotype
that women are weak, and in need of a separate standard. 88
In 1993, the EEOC proposed a middle ground standard, which
inquired "whether a reasonable person in the same or similar cir-
cumstances would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or abu-
sive."8 9 However, these guidelines were withdrawn in 1994,90 and
the courts must continue to muddle through this unclear issue.
federal circuits have adopted the standard created by Henson, courts have difficulty
applying the unwelcomeness standard and have done so inconsistently).
84. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986) (applying an
objective standard of conduct); cf. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (applying subjective
standard under which plaintiff must have regarded the conduct as undesirable or
offensive).
86. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying a
"reasonable woman standard" in a Title VII sexual harassment case); Lipsett v.
University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that the Meritor Court
did not settle the issue of whose perspective should be used to determine wel-
comeness and holding that the trier of fact must consider the perspective of both
the victim and the harasser); Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106
(5th Cir. 1988) ("[a]ny reasonable person would have to consider these cartoons
highly offensive to a woman .... ."); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich.
1993) (applying reasonable person standard and finding it sufficient to incorpo-
rate gender differences); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 458 (N.J.
1993) (using an objective reasonable standard to determine welcomeness, but us-
ing victim's subjective experiences in determining damages); Robert S. Adler &
Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman"
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 775, 777 (1993) (dis-
cussing the debate over the proper standard for evaluating hostile environment
claims).
87. See Bond, supra note 6, at 2494-95.
88. See id.
89. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, Na-
tional Origin, Age, and Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 (1993) (proposed
Oct. 1, 1993).
90. See Withdrawal of the Proposed Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (1994).
The proposed guidelines were withdrawn because they did not achieve the stated
goal of "consolidat[ing], clarify[ing] and explicat[ing] existing law pertaining to
harassment." See id. (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266).
15
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Whatever the perspective applied, determination of welcome-
ness has required scrutiny of the plaintiff's manner of speech,
dress, and conduct.9' This exposure has been limited by the recent
extension of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Amended
92Rule 412) to civil as well as criminal cases. Amended Rule 412
provides a balancing test to determine what, if any, evidence of a
plaintiffs alleged sexual behavior or predisposition will be admissi-
ble in court.9 Such evidence will only be admitted if the probative
value is substantially greater than the risk of harm to the plaintiff.
94
In addition, Amended Rule 412 shifts the burden to the defendant
to prove that the evidence should be admitted, rather than forcingS95
the plaintiff to fight for exclusion. However, despite this narrow-
ing range of evidence available to defendants,9 whether sexual
conduct was welcome still typically involves close questions of fact.
97
91. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (finding that
the plaintiffs sexually provocative speech and dress were relevant to whether she
found the conduct complained of welcome). Following the lead of Meritor, several
courts have based decisions of welcomeness on evidence of the plaintiffs speech,
dress, and/or conduct. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1260
(M.D. Tenn. 1994) (defendant claimed that plaintiffs non-sexual horseplay with a
co-worker and an incident when she was wearing shorts while off-duty at the office
indicated her willingness to have sex with him); Honea v. S.G.S. Control Serv.,
Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (denying summary judgment where
defendant's evidence against conduct being unwelcome was that plaintiff did not
always wear a bra to work); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 963
(8" Cir. 1993) (reversing the lower court's finding that plaintiff could not have
found the work environment offensive because she previously posed nude in a na-
tional magazine, which was distributed throughout the workplace); Loftin-Boggs v.
City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (plaintiff's use of
coarse language and joking in the workplace contributed to the workplace envi-
ronment such that she could not find it oppressive), af['d mem., 824 F.2d 971 (5"'
Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff must show, with some precision, a point at which
she made it known to her supervisors and co-workers that their conduct was offen-
sive); Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing evi-
dence of plaintiffs subsequent relationships with other men as relevant and pro-
bative to the question of welcomeness).
92. See FED. R. EvID. 412. The amended Rule 412 limits the use of evidence of
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in both civil and criminal cases. See FED.
R. EVID. 412(a) (1), (2). The Advisory Committee Notes specifically state that the
Rule will be applicable in sexual harassment cases under Title VII. See FED. R.
EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes.
93. See FED. R. EvID. 412.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Monnin, supra note 11, at 1210.
97. See, e.g., Pascula v. Anchor Advanced Prods., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 729, 732
(E.D. Tenn. 1993) (finding no violation of Tide VII where employees participated
in sexual horseplay); Kouri v. Liberian Servs., Inc., No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL
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2. Motive
As well as the welcomeness requirement, courts tend to probe
the context of alleged sexually harassing conduct and the underly-
ing motivation of the individual, rather than finding discrimination
per se in the statement or conduct itself.98 Courts still seem wedded
to the idea that conduct which is sexual in nature is a personal is-
sue between the parties or a natural result of employee interaction
in the workplace.
F Sexual Harassment: Unlawful Discrimination Under Title WI
The courts and the EEOC have pronounced that Title VII was
enacted with the goal of ending discrimination by allowing mem-
bers of protected classes to compete and perform in employment
on the basis of their individual qualifications, free from the hin-
drance of membership in a protected group.'0 0 The Meritor Court
clearly states that Title VII is Congress' vehicle to "'strike at the en-
tire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in em-
ployment."10'
Thus, after a long struggle for recognition in the courts, vic-
tims of sexual harassment claims are legally entitled to Title VIIS 102
protection. The courts and the EEOC have made it clear that
sexual harassment claims are recognized and governed by the same
standards as other forms of discrimination covered by Title VII.
10 3
50003, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1991) (finding no violation of Title VII where plain-
tiff sent her supervisor "mixed signals"), affid mem., 960 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
98. See Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me A "Bitch"Just Don't Use The "N-
word": Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers
v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 741, 746-47 (1997) (dis-
cussing the disparity in the way courts approach determining welcomeness and
hostile environment claims which are sex-based, versus claims that are race-based).
99. See id. at 748 (discussing the willingness of courts in sexual harassment
cases to "acquiesce in the common mores of the workplace or society"); see also su-
pra note 36 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 39-74 and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17
(1994).
101. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
102. See supra notes 34-72 and accompanying text. Every federal court of ap-
peals that has addressed the issue has held that sexual harassment violates Title
VII. SeeJudy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimina-
tion, 8J. OF LEGIS. 30, 30 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that
test for hostile work environment applies equally to claims of harassment based on
"race, gender, religion, or national origin"); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45
17
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It appears that there should be a "level plapng field" to assert sex-
ual harassment and other Title VII claims. However, this is not
the case, as demonstrated by the imposition of judicially created
hurdles, such as welcomeness, in sexual harassment claims.
The "teeth" that make the goal of Title VII protections possible
are the remedies available to victims of unlawful discrimination.
Unfortunately, the indecision and hesitancy that delayed the rec-
ognition of sexual harassment as a legal claim still haunt the award
of remedies. 0 5 The courts are still reluctant to afford sexual har-
assment victims the full range of protection provided by Title VII.
6
S 107
The victims have a legal definition for their experiences and an108
avenue for legal recourse, but even when a verdict is rendered
against a harasser, claimants struggle to meet the Title VII objec-
tives in the damages phase of the proceedings.
III. THE RECOVERY PHASE
A. History of Title VII Remedial Provisions
Title VII provides relief for victims of unlawful employment
discrimination.'0 9 In particular, courts may, at their discretion, is-
F.3d 744, 753 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the Supreme Court does not recog-
nize a difference in standards applicable to racially and sexually hostile work envi-
ronments); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270-72 (7" Cir. 1991)
(noting that the standards for sexual and racial harassment are interchangeable).
104. See Gregory, supra note 98, at 744 (focusing on the disparity between race-
and sex-based harassment claims).
105. See infra notes 191-227 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 191-227 and accompanying text.
107. See MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that, until 1976, sexual har-
assment was "literally unspeakable" because the experience had no name).
108. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing
quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref., 584
F. Supp. 419, 427-29 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (establishing sexual harassment as rooted
in the text of Title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910-12 (11th Cir.
1982) (stating that sexual harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII
whether quid pro quo or hostile work environment).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1) (1994). Title VII provides that:
[i]f the court finds that the [employer] has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the [employer] from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer.., responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability
[Vol. 24
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sue injunctions to prohibit the employer from engaging in the un-
lawful conduct and order other action including reinstatement, hir-
ing, back pay, and any other appropriate equitable relief. 1°
1. Influence of the National Labor Relations Act
The remedy provisions of Tide VII are believed to be modeled
after section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."'
Monetary remedies under the NLRA have traditionally been re-
stricted to those which can be classified as back pay. 1 1  Congress
apparently intended that Tile VII relief would be similar.1
However, courts and commentators have questioned the suffi-
ciency of using the NLRA model in determining remedies for Tile
VII cases. 114 The Supreme Court noted in Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co.115 that section 7 06(g) of Tile VII contains "broader
discretionary powers" than section 10(c) of the NLRA.1 6 In addi-
tion, while the NLRA is enforced exclusively through the adminis-
trative and judicial processes of the NLRB, Title VII emphasizes
individual action by allowing individuals to bring suit against their
employers after exhausting their administrative remedies with the118
EEOC. Thus, analogies to limitations placed on monetary relief
shall not accrue from a date more that two years prior to the filing of a
charge with the [EEOC]. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person... discriminated against shall oper-
ate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable."
Id.
110. See id.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994); See EEOC General Counsel Opinion Letter, July 20,
1966, cited in George A. Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 741, 743 n.16 (1973) (stating that the EEOC
would seek guidance in the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB)). The NLRB is charged with interpreting the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1994).
112. See Irving M. Geslewitz, Understanding the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 38 PRAc.
LAw. Mar., 1992, at 57, 59 (defining backpay). Back pay is monetary relief in the
form of compensation and benefits lost as a result of the discrimination less any
interim earnings or benefits. See id.
113. See Geslewitz, supra note 112, at 59; Davidson, supra note 111, at 742. See
also 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964).
114. See, e.g., Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 329-30 (stating that the missions
of Title VII and the NLRA are significantly different); Grimsley, supra note 17, at
215-16 (discussing the difference in the powers vested by the NLRA and Title VII.)
115. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
116. Id. at 769 n.29.
117. See29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160, 161 (1994).
118. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -7; see also Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 322-
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drawn from the context of the NLRA are not persuasive. 9 Title
VII remedies require a more flexible and individualized approach




The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ("1972
Act")' 12 greatly expanded the coverage of Title VII.122 The 1972 Act
focused on strengthening the powers of the EEOC 12 and added the
catch-all phrase "any other equitable relief' to the list of remedial
provisions in Title VII.12 Still, the remedial provisions of Title VII
were inadequate to ensure the viability of the individual action and
private enforcement on which Title VII claims depend.1
25
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") took a further step
toward providing adequate remedies for victims of sexual harass-
ment.16 Prior to the 1991 Act, circuit courts unanimously held that
24 (noting the differences in the remedial and enforcement provisions of the
NLRA and Tide VII); 1 KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII
AcTIONS § 1.8 (1994) (noting the importance of the individual litigant's role in the
Title VII process).
119. See Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title
VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1319-20 (1990) (discussing the con-
trasts between the remedial provisions in Tide VII and the NLRA both in terms of
legislative history and statutory language).
120. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 322-24.
121. Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 1-3, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a, 2000e (1994)).
122. See id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended Tide
VII protection to employees of state and local governments, expanded limitation
periods, lowered the minimum number of persons employed that render an em-
ployer subject to the provisions of Title VII to fifteen, and authorized the EEOC to
file suits. See id.; see also Stacey Elizabeth Tjon Aasland, Case Comment, Civil
Rights-The Constructive Discharge Doctrine and Its Applicability to Sexual Harassment
Cases: Does It Matter What the Employer Intended Anymore? Hukkanen v. International
Union of Operating Engineers, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993), 71 N.D. L. REV. 1067, 1071
(1995).
123. SeeKotkin, supra note 119, at 1320.
124. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103, 104-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). Despite the
lack of Congressional debate on the addition of this phrase, it has been inter-
preted as intent to increase rather than to restrict relief options. See Kotkin, supra
note 119, at 1326.
125. See Kotkin, supra note 119, at 1363 (claiming that the Title VII remedies
available in 1990 were inadequate for the types of claims most commonly asserted
because they failed to provide sufficient incentive for victims to pursue the ardu-
ous course of federal litigation).
126. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in various sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
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compensatory and punitive damages were not available under Title
VII. In addition to reversing several Supreme Court cases which
had made it more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail against an em-
ployer in a discrimination suit, the 1991 Act made compensatory
and punitive damages, expert witness fees, and jury trials available
in cases of intentional employment discrimination, including sex-1 128
ual harassment. Guaranteeing the right to ajury trial is a signifi-
cant advancement for victims of sexual harassment, who tend to be
more successful when they are able to tell their stories to juries.2 9
Opponents of the 1991 Act feared that the availability of com-
pensatory and punitive damages would detract from the concilia-
tory objectives of Title VII.130 However, provisions of the 1991 Act
explicitlyP rovided that the conciliatory provisions be left un-
touched. The 1991 Act also incorporated caps on the compensa-
132tory and punitive damages available. In addition, the history of
racial discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 suggests that
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages does not
necessarily diminish the role of conciliation proceedings.
33
Despite assuring the right to ajury trial and providing a meas-
ure of parity with the remedies available for claims of racial dis-
crimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981' 34 a close reading of the 1991
Act reveals that recovery possibilities for cases of sex discrimination,
127. See 2 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 15.1,
at 54 n.3.
128. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in various sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C. (1994)); see also TITUS E.
AARON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND A
RESEARcH OvERvIEw FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 28 (1993) (discussing the im-
pact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Title VII employment discrimination cases).
129. See Nancy Sedmak, Arbitration of Discrimination Claims Should Not Be Manda-
tory, Panelists Say, 153 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) d-21 (Aug. 9, 1995).
130. See Major Charles B. Hemicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation
to Litigation-How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MiL. L. REv. 1, 6
(1993) (stating that the 1991 Act lacks vision and direction); Hannah Katherine
Vorwerk, The Forgotten Interest Group: Reforming Title VI to Address the Concerns of
Workers While Eliminating Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1029-30 (1995)
(discussing the concern that increased remedies will encourage litigation and dis-
courage settlement).
131. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. 1071,
1079; see also Vorwerk, supra note 130, at 1030.
132. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,
1072-73.
133. See Vorwerk, supra note 130, at 1029-30 (discussing the debate surround-
ing compensatory and punitive damage provisions in the 1991 Act).
134. See 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 118, §1.9 (discussing the 1991 Act).
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and thus sexual harassment, are still restricted in ways that some
forms of discrimination are not. ' For instance, there are no caps
on recovery for actions based on race or ethnicity under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.36 As occurred with the 1972 Act, compromise led to dilu-
tion of a proper remedial scheme.
3 7
B. Title VII Remedial Objectives
Courts have held and commentators have stated that Title VII
must be interpreted as espousing dual remedial purposes in its ef-
forts to eradicate discrimination in the workplace. The purposes
are (1) providing sufficient remedy to return the plaintiff to the
point at which she would have been "but for" the unlawful dis-
crimination, 1 9 and (2) deterring employers from continuing pro-hibited conduct.14°
1. Make Whole Objective
The first major remedial purpose of Title VII is to make theS• 141
individual victim of discrimination whole. The two major com-
ponents of a make whole remedy include (1) eliminating the un-
lawful employment practice and (2) restoring the victim to a posi-
tion where he or she would have been but for the discriminatory
practice. The Supreme Court held that Congress intended to
vest a variety of discretionary powers in the courts to make possible
135. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see also
Francis Carlton, Women in the Workplace and Sex Discrimination Law: A Feminist Analy-
sis of Federal Jurisprudence, 13 WOMEN & POL. 17 (1991) (suggesting that sex dis-
crimination is not viewed as seriously as racial and religious discrimination be-
cause it is subject to caps on damage awards).
136. See Hernicz, supra note 130, at 73.
137. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 119, at 3127 (stating that Congress, in enacting
the 1972 Act, recognized the inadequacies of Tide VII, but addressed the en-
forcement, rather than the remedial provisions); Geslewitz, supra note 112, at 61-
62 (noting that the imposition of caps on damages in the 1991 Act reflects a com-
promise in Congress arising from concerns for the effect of unlimited damages on
employers).
138. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975);
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995); Grebeld-
inger, supra note 12, at 326.
139. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
141. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417..
142. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 323 (citing the 1972 Conference Re-
port, 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) and explaining that the 1972 amend-
ments provided the courts with wide discretion to fashion relief).
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the "fashion[ing] of the most complete relief possible.' 43  The
EEOC also supports the application of a wide range of remedial
measures in enforcing Title VII.'" Further, the legislative history of
section 7 06 (g), while sketchy,' 45 supports the make whole approach
to Title VII relief.'4 These factors support the interpretation of Ti-
tle VII relief as designed to restore a plaintiff to the position that
would have been attained absent the unlawful discrimination. 1
47
2. Deterrence
The second primary purpose of Title VII is to deter future dis-
crimination in the workplace. 1 The Supreme Court supported the
deterrence purpose in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody149 and McKennon• . . 150
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. The remedy fashioned for de-
143. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421; see also McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357-58 (stating
that compensation for injuries caused by unlawful discrimination is an object of
Title VII and the ADEA); Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 1995)
(stating that courts must fashion relief that "create [s] and maintain [s] a level, dis-
crimination-free playing field and ... make [s] victims of discrimination whole");
Sinai v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471, 476 (1st Cir. 1993) ("It] he pur-
pose of damages under Title VII is to make the plaintiff whole"); Grebeldinger,
supra note 12, at 325-26 (noting the support in the federal courts and the EEOC
for remedial measures which provide the victim with complete relief).
144. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614. 501 (a) (1997). The EEOC encourages that the rem-
edy for individual cases of discrimination against public employees must consist of
elements appropriate to the specific circumstances. See id.
145. See Vaas, supra note 29, at 457 (stating that the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consists mainly of speeches and debates and is not the
kind of statutory background upon which courts like to rely); see, e.g., 118 CONG.
REC. 7168 (1972); 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), re-
printed in 1964 U.S.C.CA.N. 2391.
146. See Vaas, supra note 29, at 457; see also Grimsley, supra note 17, at 214. As
cited by Grimsley, the analysis accompanying the Conference Committee Report
on the 1972 amendments stated that:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts the wide
discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete re-
lief possible. In dealing with the present section 706 (g) the courts have
stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended
to make the victim of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the at-
tainment of the objective.., requires that persons aggrieved by the con-
sequences... be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they
would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 214 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (emphasis added)).
147. See Grimsley, supra note 17, at 214.
148. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 326.
149. 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (stating that the absence of complete remedies
fails to serve as incentive to shun dubious employment practices).
150. 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) ("Deterrence is one object of these statutes.");
see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (noting the objec-
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terrence purposes should not only punish the employer but should
also provide assurance to other workers that the statutes do provide
protection. 5'
Following these precedents, the courts have utilized Title VII
remedies to meet these dual purposes. One important element of
relief is front pay, which, when correctly applied, meets the dual
objectives of Title VII.
1 52
C. Remedial Similarities to the ADEA
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 1 ' origi-
nally enacted in 1967, prohibits age discrimination in the employ-
ment, discharge, promotion, or treatment of persons over the age
of forty.5 4 The Supreme Court has noted that "the prohibitions of
the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII."5 5While many
of the enforcement and remedial provisions of the ADEA were
156based in part upon the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the re-
medial language in section 7(b) of the ADEA is broader than that
of the FLSA, and more analogous to that of Title VII.
5 7
Further similarity to Title VII is found in the ADEA's emphasis
on individual remedial efforts, rather than the public interest.
15
For example, both statutes are enforced by the EEOC, with the
right to private action following an exhaustion of the EEOC's at-
tive of Title VII is to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove
barriers that have operated in the past"); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a)
(1997) (recognizing that in some instances remedial measures should be designed
to prevent the recurrence of similar unlawful employment practices).
151. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 326.
152. See infra notes 172-88 and accompanying text.
153. Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 1-17, 81 Stat. 602-608 (1967) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)).
154. See id.
155. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). In haec verba is defined as, "in
the same words." BLAcK's LAw DIcIoNARY 782 (6th ed. 1990).
156. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060-1069 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)). The FLSA was passed in
1938 to regulate issues affecting the "health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers" such as child labor, overtime, and minimum wages. Id. § 202. See also
Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 582 (discussing Congress' intent to incorporate provisions of
the FLSA into the ADEA); 113 CONG. REc. 31,248, 31,254 (1967) (noting the in-
corporation of FLSA enforcement techniques and provisions into the ADEA).
157. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 325 (noting the use of language such
as "without limitation" and "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate"
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tempts "to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices al-
leged and to effect voluntary compliance."
In addition, the courts have made it clear that the ADEA
shares Title VII's purpose of eliminating discrimination in the
workplace, through the dual objectives of complete relief and de-
terring future discrimination. Thus, despite some differences in
language and statutory model, courts frequently apply Title VII
case law to ADEA suits and vice versa."
In enforcing the ADEA and Title VII, the EEOC provides the
courts with broad discretion in fashioning remedies so as to pro-
vide the "most complete relief possible.' 62  Accordingly, courts
must award successful plaintiffs in employment discrimination
cases a full range of retrospective relief and prospective relief.
6 3
D. Fashioning Adequate Remedies
Prospective relief is most often applied where a victim of dis-
crimination has been illegally discharged from his or her position.
Generally, voluntary termination of employment terminates the
right to damages. Constructive discharge, however, developed as
a protection for the employee who is forced to resign as a result of
159. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994); see also Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 325 (stat-
ing that, like Title VII, the ADEA allows for a private cause of action once the ad-
ministrative remedies of the EEOC have been exhausted).
160. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357-58
(1995) (discussing the common purposes and objectives of the ADEA and Title
VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (discussing the two-
fold purpose of statutory remedies in employment discrimination cases).
161. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 325; see also McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358
(stating that the ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and the
common purpose of eliminating discrimination from the workplace); McKnight v.
General Motors Corp. 973 F.2d 1366, 1369 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Title
VII and the ADEA both vest broad discretion in the trial courts for awarding legal
and equitable relief) (citing Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149,
162 n.19 (7" Cir. 1981); Wildman v. Lemer Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 615-16 (1"
Cir. 1985) (surveying ADEA and Title VII holdings in other circuits before adopt-
ing a front pay rule for ADEA cases); but see Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d
1473, 1481 (10" Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Seth,J. concurring and dissenting) (stat-
ing that it is not appropriate to analogize to Title VII for determining ADEA dam-
ages).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501 (a) (1997); but see Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417 (limiting
judicial discretion by holding that the relief granted must effectuate the purposes
of the statute and minimize inconsistencies that could thwart those purposes).
163. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 326.
164. See, e.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986); Sat-
terwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
25
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Constructive discharge has been applied to sexual harassment166
cases. However, the circuit courts continue to disagree as to the
appropriate standard for determining whether an employee has
been constructively discharged as a result of the sexual harass-
ment.117 This disparity provides yet another gray area for plaintiffs
attempting to successfully negotiate "the shifting shoals of present-
day federal employment discrimination law."'6
IV. FRONT PAY AS A PROSPECTIVE REMEDY
A. Definition and History of Front Pay
Front pay is a monetary award intended to compensate the vic-
tim of discrimination for future economic losses likely to be suf-
fered between the date of judgment and the time the victim
reaches his or her rightful place. 9 The courts have defined front
pay in a variety of ways, all of which stress the make-whole theory of
165. See, e.g., Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 521 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying
constructive discharge in a sexual harassment case); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co.,
747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying constructive discharge in a preg-
nancy discrimination case); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d
Cir. 1983) (applying constructive discharge in an age discrimination case).
166. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907 (11th Cir. 1982) ("when
'an employee involuntarily resigns in order to escape intolerable and illegal em-
ployment requirements' to which he or she is subjected to because of... sex...
the employer has committed a constructive discharge in violation of Tide VII")
(citation omitted).
167. See Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) ("there
is a divergence of opinion as to the findings necessary for such application [of the
constructive discharge] in specific instances").
168. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
169. See, e.g., Downes v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1141 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1994) (defining front pay as a lump sum "representing the... value of the
difference between the earnings [an employee] would have received in his old
employment and the earnings he can expect to receive in his present and future,
and by hypothesis inferior, employment"); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389,
398 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that front pay monetizes the value of lost employment
opportunities); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982); 2
SPRIGGS, supra note 118, § 29.45 (discussing the merits of front pay); 45C AM. JUR.
2D Job Discrimination § 2973 (1993) (discussing the appropriateness of front pay).
The rightful place theory of relief, adopted by the Supreme Court in Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), is designed to put the victim of
discrimination in the position that she or he would have been in but for the un-
lawful conduct. The Franks Court notes that both houses of Congress affirmed the
rightful place objective and the remedies necessary to attain the objectives of Tide
VII. See id. at 764.
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relief. Although front pay has not been expressly mentioned as a
remedy in federal job discrimination laws, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds that front pay is available under these laws
in appropriate circumstances.
7 2
Considered "prospective relief," front pay is awarded to victims
of employment discrimination to compensate them for the con-
tinuing future effects of discrimination until they can be made
"whole., 7 3 The courts exert wide discretion in deciding whether to
award front pay. 1 4 Courts traditionally consider the following fac-
tors to determine whether front pay is appropriate: (1) whether the
plaintiff has been made whole by back pay; (2) whether front pay
would be unduly speculative given the plaintiffs prospects for con-
tinued employment; (3) whether reinstatement is appropriate or
feasible; (4) whether liquidated damages have been awarded; and
(5) whether the former employer's financial condition is adverse. 5
170. See Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that
the purpose of front pay is to make the plaintiff whole and to restore him or her to
the economic position he or she would have enjoyed but for the unlawful conduct
of the employer); Carter v. County of Sedgwick, 36 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting the make-whole purpose of front pay in Title VII cases); ROBERT BELTON,
REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 10.1 (1992).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) ("the court may... order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to
reinstatement... with or without backpay... or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate").
172. See, e.g., Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No.
101, 3 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1993) (awarding front pay for ten years where un-
lawful discrimination under Title VII resulted in the victim having lower paying
job); Willis v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 749 F. Supp. 923, 924 (E.D. Ark. 1990)
(upholding award of front pay after finding of discrimination where immediate
promotion was impracticable); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889-90
(3d Cir. 1984) (stating that courts have discretion to award front pay where rein-
statement would lead to a likelihood of ongoing animosity and difficulty in polic-
ing the work relationship); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161,
1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding in this ADEA case that front pay may be warranted
in some cases where reinstatement may be unwarranted or undesirable); Patterson
v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding prospective
pay award may be necessary to supplement back pay until victim can assume job
"commensurate with their status" in a Title VII case); 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimi-
nation § 2973 (1993); Kotkin, supra note 119, at 1376 (stating that front pay is only
statutorily authorized to the extent that it falls within "other equitable relief").
173. See Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418, to emphasize the make-whole purpose of Title VII).
174. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp. 973 F.2d 1366, 1369 (7 Cir. 1992).
175. See 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2974, at 727 (1993); see also Kele-
wae v. Jim Meagher Chevrolet, Inc. 952 F2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying
equitable relief in view of the defendant's adverse financial condition); Wilcox v.
Stratton Lumber, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 837 (D. Me. 1996). In Wilcox, the award of
27
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The Supreme Court provided indirect support for front pay in
Albemarle by emphasizing the general make-whole purpose of back
pay under section 10(c) of the NLRA. 176 In this class action, the
plaintiffs alleged discrimination in the employer's seniority and
employment testing program, forcing the Court to determine the
standard for awarding back pay to victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion.177 Although the issue in this case was back pay specific, the
court stressed the necessity of Title VII remedies that are "conso-
nant with the twin statutory objectives.",17  Thus, the Supreme
Court set the standard that remedial plans must necessarily provide
the victim with complete relief.
Front pay was then directly endorsed by the Fourth Circuit in
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 179 which is viewed as one of the180
seminal cases in support of front pay. The Patterson court ad-
dressed potential remedies for victims of discriminatory practices
by the employer and union in promoting employees to supervisory
positions, as well as the assignment of job duties.M The district
court required the employer to implement a "bumping" system,
whereby senior minority or female employees could bump junior
employees from preferred jobs.8 2 The Fourth Circuit noted that,
while Congress did not view Title VII as a vehicle for displacing in-
nocent incumbents, Congress did not intend to leave victims with-
out a remedy."" The court reiterated the make whole emphasis in
Albemarle by stating that a back pay award from the "time the em-
ployee was unlawfully denied a position until the date ofjudgment"
front pay was denied where plaintiff was only 37 years old, not too old to begin
new employment, and where defendant business' financial difficulties made it
likely that the business would not survive. See 921 F. Supp. at 844.
176. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418. "[T]he [district] court has not merely the
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id.
(quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
177. Seeid.at408-09.
178. Id. at 421. The Supreme Court set the standard for federal district courts
to follow in fashioning Title VII remedies that serve the dual purpose of "eradicat-
ing discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for inju-
ries suffered through past discrimination." Id.
179. 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
180. See BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.3. The importance of Patterson was its
adoption of front pay as the means of harmonizing the presumption of reinstate-
ment and the anti-bumping sentiment to effectuate the rightful place objectives of
Title VII. See id.
181. See Patterson, 535 F.2d at 263-64.
182. Id. at 267.
183. See id. at 269.
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should be supplemented by an award of the "estimated present
value of lost earnings that are reasonably likely to occur between
the date of judgment and the time when the employee can assume
his new position.",8 4 Although the court did not use the term
"front pay," the intent was clearly to endorse prospective monetary
remedies.
An award of front pay also meets the deterrent objective of Ti-
tie VII. As noted by the Supreme Court in Albemarle, employers
who face only the penalty of an injunctive order will have less in-
centive to eschew unlawful employment practices.1s 6 While the Al-
bemarle court spoke of the threat of back pay awards as the "spur or
catalyst" to force employers and unions to examine and improve
their employment practices,8 7 this reasoning supports the remedy
of front pay as well.
In practice, courts have made large frontpay awards in egre-
gious cases, attempting to end illegal conduct. Front pay awards,
as such, have been recognized as a deterrent against future viola-
tions.' s9
Clearly, courts and scholars have demonstrated support for
front pay, even pointing to its logical necessity. 90 Yet for manyyears, front pay has been overlooked, denied, or unnecessarily lim-
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417.
187. See id. at 417-18.
188. See, e.g., Boehm v. ABC Co., 929 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying
California law to uphold an award that included six years of projected future earn-
ings losses); Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that a five year award of front pay was within court's discretion); Dominic v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1987) (awarding two years
of front pay); Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn.
1987) ("[A]n award of front pay in this egregious case will aid in ending the sexual
harassment of women at [defendant company] and will aid in rectifying the harm
caused [plaintiff]"); Snow v. Pillsbury Co., 650 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn. 1986)
(awarding three years of front pay); Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C8-96-1640,
1997 WL 30695, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 1997) (upholding a front pay award
of 12 years in a sexual harassment case); see also Shore v. Federal Express Corp.,
777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding the award of front pay in the situation
but remanding for further determination of the amount).
189. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172 (10th
Cir. 1985) (citing Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). The courts have the authority to authorize future damages as
compensation for victims of discrimination and to deny that authority would re-
move a deterrent force against future violations. See id.
190. See 2 SpgiGGs, supra note 118, § 29.45 ("Few concepts are more doctrinally
sound than front pay").
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ited as a remedy. The courts have tightly restricted the conditions
under which front pay may be granted, unnecessarily showing a
strong preference for the remedies of back pay and reinstatement.
B. Limitations of Back Pay
Back pay is the preferred remedy of the NLRA, on which the
remedial provisions of Title VII were based.'91 Courts in both Title
VII and ADEA cases have presented back pay as a presumptive ele-
ment of damages in a situation of illegal discharge. While not an
automatic entitlement, back pay is awarded at the discretion of the
court and should only be denied in the most limited of circum-
193stances.
Because of its prospective coverage, front pay is a supplement
to, not a replacement for, back pay. Courts will first determine
whether the back pay awarded provides adequate remedy to make
the plaintiff whole for the injuries caused by the discrimination, be-
fore considering front pay. However, the courts must be careful
not to discount the necessity of front pay in reaching the "make
196whole" objective. The logical extension of the argument that
191. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 788, 794 (3d Cir. 1985)
(referring to back wages as a mandatory element of damages in this ADEA case);
Walters v. City of Atlanta, 610 F. Supp. 715, 728 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (stating that a Ti-
tle VII claimant is presumptively entitled to back pay), affd in part, rev'd in part, 803
F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986).
193. See Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 226 (1982) (stating that the
court must exercise discretion to award back pay in the "light of the large objec-
tives of the Act") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415416
(1975)).
194. See45CAM.JUR. 2DJobDiscrimination§ 2975 (1993).
195. See id.; see also Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 837, 844 (D.
Me. 1996) (denying front pay); Eldred v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 907 F.
Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that back pay alone made the plaintiff
whole); Whites v. Hahn, 699 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (denying front pay
in belief that back pay award made plaintiff whole).
196. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.
1976) ("back pay.., until the date ofjudgment... should be supplemented by an
award equal to the estimated present value of lost earnings that are reasonably
likely to occur between the date ofjudgment and the time when the employee can
assume his new position"); Grimsley, supra note 17, at 212 ("[flront pay is an af-
firmative order designed to compensate the plaintiff for economic losses that have
not occurred as of the date of the court decree, but that may occur as the plaintiff
works towards his or her rightful place"); 2 SpRiGGS, supra note 118, § 29.45
("[f]ront pay is the pay to which a discriminatee is entitled from judgment day
(end of back pay) until she reaches her rightful place").
[Vol. 24
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front pay is merely a continuation of back pay designed to make
the plaintiff whole leads to the conclusion that "prohibition of
front pay constitutes a prospective denial of back pay."
197
Front pay and back pay must work together because each is in-
tended to compensate for different periods of harm." Rarely will a
plaintiff be "made whole" and reach his or her "rightful place" as of'99
judgment day with only an award of back pay. Until the plaintiff
has had the opportunity to move into the position denied by unlaw-
ful discrimination, he or she has not been fully compensated under
Title VI.' °
Moreover, there is danger in restricting the plaintiff to losses
sustained from the date of discharge to the date of the verdict or
judgment.20 ' It is possible that such a policy would encourage the
employee to delay the judgment date as long as possible in order to




Clearly, there are risks inherent in limiting Title VII awards to
back pay alone. The courts should not overlook the possibility that
front pay is required as post-judgment compensation for earnings
lost between judgment day and attainment of the rightful job post
when fashioning remedies under Title VII.
23
C. Preference for Reinstatement
1. Judicial Preference, Not Statutory Mandate
Even where courts have recognized the need for prospective
relief, there has been a strong preference for reinstatement. 2°4 In
197. Grimsley, supra note 17, at 224.
198. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir. 1965)
(stating that the purpose of front pay is compensation for "the post-judgment ef-
fects of past discrimination").
199. See 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 118, § 29.45.
200. See id.; see also Patterson, 535 F.2d at 269 (stating that some victims of dis-
crimination "will be unable to move immediately into jobs to which their seniority
and ability entitle them" and awards "should be fashioned to compensate them
until they can obtain ajob commensurate with their status"). Patterson was one of
the earliest cases to determine class-wide front pay. See 2 SPRGGS, supra note 118, §
29.45.
201. See Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
202. See id. at 1169.
203. See 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 118, § 29.45.
204. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (holding front pay
31
Papacek: Sexual Harassment and the Struggle for Equal Treatment under Titl
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REV1EW
support of this preference, courts rely on the fact that the remedial
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA specifically list reinstatement
as a form of relief, while not mentioning front pay.2°5 However,
merely by listing reinstatement, the statutes do not mandate pref-
erential consideration of reinstatement.206 The Supreme Court, in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 20' ruled that remedies not spe-
cifically mentioned in statute are no less available than those
listed. The Franks Court addressed the issue of whether seniority
relief was available under section 706(g) of Title VII, even though it209
was not expressly listed as a remedy. Noting that the 1972
amendments to the Civil Rights Act affirmed the breadth of discre-
tion Congress granted to courts in awarding appropriate remedies,
the Court held that a potential remedy should not be disregarded
merely because Congress did not mention it specifically in the re-•210
medial language. Following this, the courts have recognized that
Title VII grants the discretion to determine remedies based on the
facts of each case, rather than on preferential language.21
Likewise, reliance on the NLRA model and its preference for
reinstatement fails to support a reinstatement preference in Title
212VII actions. As previously discussed, the goals of Title VII differ
significantly from those of the NLRA, and the discretion afforded
to the courts in fashioning remedial provisions reflects those dif-
ferences.213
Finally, the courts seem to view reinstatement as the best
means to meet the policy objectives of the statutes and the EEOC
should not be awarded where the court determines that reinstatement provides
appropriate relief); Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 327; 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Dis-
crimination § 2973 (1993) (defining front pay as prospective relief to be awarded
for losses that "cannot be remedied by traditional rightful-place relief such as hir-
ing, promotion, or reinstatement").
205. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 328.
206. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976) (noting
that although backpay is specifically mentioned in the statute, it is not prohibitive
of other types of relief).
207. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
208. See id. at 764 n.21.
209. See id. at 763-64.
210. See id. at 764 n.21.
211. See, e.g., McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (7"'
Cir. 1992) (upholding the trial court's refusal of reinstatement based on an acri-
monious relationship between the parties and a lack of available position).
212. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 329-30.
213. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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Statement of Remedies and Relief.214  However, these arguments
also assume a preference that is not explicit in the language and
ignore not only the difficulties of reinstatement, 215 but also the ad-
216
vantages of front pay.
2. Difficulties With Reinstatement
Because of this judicial preference, the court will generally ex-
ercise its discretion to award the plaintiff front pay only where the
remedy of reinstatement is not appropriate and when the plaintiff
has not yet found comparable work. There are several potential
difficulties created by reinstatement.218 The most frequent reason
for finding reinstatement impracticable is that the relationship be-
tween employee and the former employer has been irreparably
damaged by hostility such that a productive working relationship
219would be impossible. In such cases, the court may exercise its
214. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 330-31.
215. See id. at 330-31; see also infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
216. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 332-33; see also supra notes 173-89 and
accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966 (10th Cir. 1987)
(reversing denial of front pay as a matter of law and remanding for determination
of front pay availability); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1474
(I1th Cir. 1985) (noting that front pay is a possible remedy where reinstatement is
not feasible); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984)
(awarding front pay where the employer-employee relationship was irreparably
damaged); Mosley v. Clarksville Mem'l Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 224, 237 (M.D. Tenn.
1983) (awarding front pay under the discretionary equitable authority of the
court); see also BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.5 (explaining the discretion of the
courts to award front pay where reinstatement is inappropriate); Geslewitz, supra
note 112, at 59 (stating that some courts award front pay or projected earnings
when the normal remedy of reinstatement was found to be either unworkable or
unfeasible).
218. See Grebeldinger, supra note 12, at 332-39 (discussing the difficulties of
reinstatement). The author provides five significant problems created by rein-
statement: (1) the passage of time due to litigation may make reinstatement im-
practicable for a variety of reasons; (2) reinstatement might require the "bump-
ing" of another employee; (3) the workplace may still be hostile and even
retaliatory; (4) the work relationship may not have been satisfactory for the par-
ties, even aside from the discriminatory conduct; (5) and the court would need to
keep continued jurisdiction over the workplace to assure compliance with the re-
instatement. See id.
219. See, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 615-16 (1st Cir.
1985); Nord v. United Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1473 (11th Cir. 1985); Whittle-
sey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 739 (2d Cir. 1984); Maxfield v. Sinclair
Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 788, 795-97 (3d Cir. 1985); Shore v. Federal Express Corp.,
777 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1985); see also BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.6 (dis-
cussing the claim that reinstatement is impracticable).
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discretion not to order reinstatement, rather than force the victim
back into an atmosphere of hostility.
20
However, front pay is not awarded in lieu of reinstatement
when the hostility claimed by the plaintiff is merely the inevitable
bad feelings resulting from the conclusion of an employment dis-
crimination case. 22' The court views a plaintiff's request for the "al-
ternative remedy" of front pay due to a disinclination to return to
222the employer with an extremely critical eye. This preference for
reinstatement can be especially harsh in its application to sexual
harassment claims.
At the point in the proceedings when damages are deter-
mined, it has already been held that the plaintiff was a victim of
sexual harassment. Whether subjected to quid pro quo harassment
or to a hostile work environment, there can be no question that the
workplace was an intolerable place for the victim to work. The
courts have determined that the damage suffered by the plaintiff is
real. Yet, the court's preference in providingprospective relief is
to send the victim back into this environment. This is often an
unreasonable preference.
Front pay is also preferable to reinstatement when returning
the plaintiff to the former position would require "bumping"
225someone else out of a job. Courts have provided factors to de-
termine whether to bump an incumbent.226 In most cases, this in-
cumbent is innocent of any wrongdoing in the situation and be-
comes yet another victim.
When a sexual harassment case has reached the remedies
220. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting that, although reinstatement is usually the preferred remedy, it is
not always required); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th
Cir. 1980) (upholding front pay in lieu of reinstatement where defendant had en-
gaged in psychological warfare against plaintiff).
221. See, e.g., Evans v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 861 F. Supp. 851, 859 n.1
(W.D. Mo. 1994) (stating that the friction from the litigation is not sufficient to
preclude reinstatement); Curtis v. Robern, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 451, 457-58 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that the inevitable hostility accompanying an employment dis-
crimination case cannot preclude reinstatement, which is the preferred remedy).
222. See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that plaintiff's disinclination to return to former employer must be
rational and sincere and not merely a maneuver to get front pay).
223. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
224. See supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
225. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976).
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stage, it has already been established that a victim was either actu-
ally or constructively discharged from a workplace environment
that was hostile or abusive. Further, it may have been determined
that reinstatement was not appropriate either because the relations
between the victim and the former employer have deteriorated or
because reinstatement would disrupt the employment of others.
Even in these extreme cases, however, front pay is still not auto-
227matic. This remaining hesitancy to award front pay, even when it
seems logically necessary to make the plaintiff whole, may lie in the
228
judicial concern that front pay as a future damage is speculative.
3. Reinstatement Versus Front Pay Under the ADEA
Reinstatement has also been the preferred prospective remedy
in ADEA cases.2 29 Early ADEA cases considering prospective relief
reflect a conflict among the circuits regarding the appropriateness
of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. However, this conflict
seems to have been resolved.23 1 Recent ADEA cases have shown an
increased willingness to award front pay and to extend the award
period for a greater period of time, a trend which should, in
turn, benefit plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases.
227. Cf Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984)
("Front pay does not lend itself to a per se rule. It is neither mandated nor pro-
hibited by the [ADEA]. Rather, it is but one of a broad range of remedial meas-
ures available under the ADEA").
228. See infra notes 233-43 and accompanying text; see also Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979).
229. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73
(10th Cir. 1985) (stating that reinstatement is the preferred remedy and should be
ordered whenever possible). The court recognized the legitimacy of front pay, but
remanded for an articulation of why future damages were more appropriate in this
case than reinstatement. See id.
230. See, e.g., Pru7dentia 763 F.2d at 1172 (discussing the various decisions re-
garding reinstatement in lieu of front pay); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742
F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussing the conflict among the circuits).
231. See Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1172.
232. See, e.g., Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d
Cir. 1996) (awarding front pay for more than 20 years), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2453
(1997); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1189 (2d Cir. 1992) (af-
firming an award of front pay for 17 years); Buckley v. Reynolds Metals Co., 690 F.
Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (awarding nine years in front pay).
35
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D. A Call for Greater Acceptance of Front Pay
1. Overcoming Fear of Undue Speculation
In addition to overcoming a preference for reinstatement,
proponents of front pay also contend with the prejudice against
front pay as being inherently indefinite and speculative. Plaintiffs
have been denied front pay because courts found the evidence of
future damages insufficient to warrant prospective relief.2M  How-
ever, other courts, while recognizing the speculative nature of front
pay, have not automatically objected to front pay relief, finding that
uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the injured party.
2 s
1
Courts in employment discrimination cases have drawn an analogy
to the speculation of future earnings in tort litigation such as
236breach of employment contract and personal injury. Courts and
juries regularly make these decisions and therefore possess ample
experience in assessing damages for future loss of earnings in Title
237VII cases.In addition, the mere fact that damages may be difficult to
233. See Wilcox v. Stratton Lumber, Inc., 921 F. Supp 837, 844 (D. Me. 1996)
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages, but denying front pay because the
court found plaintiffs testimony about limited prospects for similar employment
was speculative and not supported by any expert testimony).
234. See Eldred v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 907 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.
Mass. 1995) (speculative inquiry precluded award of front pay); Easter v. Jeep
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 515, 521 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (finding front pay inappropriate in
sexual harassment case where "evidence adduced at the hearing [did not] form
any basis for an award of future damages"). The Easter court held that future
damages can only be compensated for when they are reasonably certain to result.
See538 F. Supp. at 521. See also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366,
1372 (2d Cir. 1992). The McKnight court held that the plaintiff must provide the
necessary data to calculate a reasonably certain front pay award including such fac-
tors as (1) the length of time the plaintiff expected to work for the defendant, (2)
the discount rate, and (3) the amount of the award. See id. at 1372.
235. See Kotkin, supra note 119, at 1377; see also Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d
1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that front pay should not be denied merely
because some speculation is necessary); Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822
F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that award of front pay is within judge's
equitable discretion); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir.
1985) (finding district court has discretion to award front pay, though speculative,
upon consideration of circumstances of case).
236. SeeBarbourv. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
237. See id. (holding that courts are capable of resolving the uncertainties of a
front pay award); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that courts and juries can readily decide an award of pro-
spective losses in a case upon its individual facts).
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compute should not exonerate a wrongdoer from liability. The
oft-cited case of Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co.,2 39 an ADEA case,
held that the wrongdoer must "bear the risk of the uncertainty
which his own wrong has created."2 40 Koyen held that this imposi-
tion of risk and the duty to mitigate the damages suffered by the
plaintiff are public policy considerations that defeat a blanket rejec-
tion of front pay merely because it may require a measure of specu-
lation.241
Courts have also found that front pay awards can be made
much less uncertain and speculative by considering some of the in-. .. . .242
herent and court-implied limitations of front pay. The critical
question seems to be whether the court, in considering all of the
applicable circumstances, finds the speculation of a front pay award
to be "undue."
243
2. Inherent Controls on Front Pay Awards
Front pay is intended to be temporary in nature. 244 Therefore,
238. See Koyen, 560 F. Supp. at 1169 (citing Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946); cf Brink's Inc., v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp.
403, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (calling for ajust and reasonable estimate of damages
when defendant's tortious conduct is of such a nature that precise ascertainment
is precluded). The Bigelow Court stated that this ancient principle has widespread
application in the determination of remedies and held that "[d]ifficulty of ascer-
tainment is no longer confused with right of recovery." 327 U.S. at 265 (quoting
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565 (1930)).
239. 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
240. Id. at 1169 (citing Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265). In Koyen, the plaintiff estab-
lished that his termination violated the ADEA and sought front pay to cover the
loss of salary up until his 70'h birthday, a period of approximately 23 months. See
id. at 1163-64, 1167. The court recognized the conflict that existed in the courts
regarding the availability of future earnings recovery in ADEA cases. See id. at
1167. The Koyen court found that an award for future loss of earnings is within the
broad grant of legal and equitable power of the ADEA. See id. at 1168. Further,
the court found that the necessity of making the victim whole outweighed the
concerns of speculation and uncertainty. See id. at 1168-69.
241. See id. at 1169.
242. See infra notes 244-63 and accompanying text; see also BELTON, supra note
170, § 10.11 (discussing factors the court may use to reduce speculation in front
pay awards).
243. See BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.11.
244. See, e.g., Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 709 (3d Cir. 1988)
("The purpose of front pay.., is to ensure that a person who has been discrimi-
nated against.., is made whole, not to guarantee every claimant who cannot miti-
gate damages by finding comparable work an annuity to [retirement age]"); Cas-
sino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987) (front pay "is
intended to be temporary in nature"); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 672
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should front pay be awarded, the courts generally limit the award
to a relatively brief period of time. 45 The time period allotted for a
front pay award is typically that which is shown to be sufficient to
enable the plaintiff to secure alternative comparable employ-
ment.2 4  The courts impose upon this time frame a presumption
that the plaintiff is searching for work in a fairjob market.
An illegally discharged Title VII plaintiff has a duty to mitigate
damages.24 The principle of mitigation requires a victim to take
reasonable steps to minimize the harm, or risk having the award of
damages reduced. Known in tort law as "avoidable conse-
quences," mitigation in employment discrimination cases is meas-
250ured by a test of reasonable diligence. Implicit in the front pay
doctrine, then, is the plaintiffs duty to mitigate damages through a
reasonable search for comparable employment.251 Further, in or-
F. Supp. 1408, 1416 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (characterizing front pay as a "short-term al-
ternative"), affd in pertinent part, 863 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989).
245. See Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Because
of the potential for windfall, [the] use [of front pay] must be tempered").
246. See, e.g., Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir.
1987) (awarding two years of front pay as reasonable time to find comparable em-
ployment); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889-91 (3d Cir. 1984) (af-
firming the trial court's front pay award for period of four months to cover rea-
sonable expected period ofjob loss); see also David A. Cathcart, Emerging Standards
Defining Contract, Emotional Distress, and Punitive Damages in Employment Cases, SB36
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1507, 1544 (1997) ("Federal courts may award front pay in lieu of re-
instatement for a period of time until the plaintiff is likely to become reem-
ployed").
247. See Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
("Nothing in [Title VII] indicates that the employer's liability extends to condi-
tions of the marketplace which it did not create").
248. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984).
The court stated that an award of front pay "does not contemplate that a plaintiff
will sit idly by and be compensated for doing nothing, because the duty to mitigate
damages by seeking employment elsewhere significantly limits the amount of front
pay available." Id. (citing Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161,
1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). The Koyen court defined mitigation as reasonable efforts
by the plaintiff to secure gainful employment given the available job market. See
560 F. Supp. at 1168 (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219, 231 & nn.14-15 (1982) (holding that a plaintiff in an employment discrimina-
tion action has the same duty to mitigate as a plaintiff bringing tort or breach of
contract claims).
249. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986).
250. See id. In Hunter, the plaintiff applied to only 16 employers in five years
and worked only sporadically in that time. See id. at 1427-28. The court found that
his efforts did not constitute reasonable diligence. See id. at 1428.
251. See Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987)
("It is clear that front pay awards, like back pay awards, must be reduced by the
amount plaintiff could earn using reasonable mitigation efforts"); Reneau v.
[Vol. 24
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der to receive an award of front pay the plaintiff must be available,
252willing, and able to work. Thus, a discharged victim of discrimi-
nation cannot sit idly by, but must fulfill the duty to mitigate dam-
ages by making reasonable efforts to obtain gainful employment in
the available market.
255
It has been argued that the potential of the more attractive
remedy of front pay could discourage settlement.254  However,
courts have determined that this institutional risk is balanced
against the defendants' increased inclination to compromise with
255
potential liability for front pay.
3. Ease of Administration
Early cases addressing prospective monetary remedies strug-
256gled with the proper method of implementing front pay. How-
ever, more recent cases have utilized a variety of effective meth-
257
ods. In general, for the award to be precise, it should be gauged
to the specific difference between the actual earnings of the in-
jured employee and those the victim would have made had he or
she been in the rightful place.2  There are a variety of methods for
implementing an award of front pay, depending on the circum-
stances of the case. For instance, when front pay is only a tempo-
rary substitute for reinstatement until an appropriate position be-
comes available, courts have made periodic awards based on the
Wayne Griffin & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Front pay may be
denied or reduced when the employee fails to mitigate damages by seeking other
employment"); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), (allowing the plaintiff a broad range of reasonable conduct in conducting a
job search and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every doubt), affd, 559 F.2d 1203
(2d Cir. 1977).
252. See, e.g., Floca v. Homecare Health Servs., Inc., 845 F.2d 108, 112-13 (5th
Cir. 1988) (denying front pay when plaintiff returned to school); Wehr v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding the question of front
pay was not properly before the court where plaintiff, formerly an engineer, en-
tered law school following illegal discharge and had specifically disclaimed any in-
terest in reinstatement).
253. See Koyen, 560 F. Supp. at 1167-69; see also Kallir, 420 F. Supp. at 926-27 (al-
lowing the plaintiff a broad range of reasonable conduct in conducting a job
search).
254. See Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc., 789 F.2d 253, 261 (3d
Cir. 1986); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984);
Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
255. See Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728.
256. See 2 SpRiGGs, supra note 118, § 29.46.
257. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
258. See2 SpRiGGs, supra note 118, § 29.46.
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difference between the specific earnings in each time frame.
This requires courts to make up the difference between the victim
and an actual or hypothetical person in the rightful place for an ex-
tended period of time, particularly when it appears unlikely that
the victim will find another job paying as much as the former posi-
tion. 260 "Red circling," a method most frequently used in seniority
discrimination cases, allows the victim to maintain wage status while
training for a position that the victim might have advanced to ear-
261lier but for unlawful discrimination.
When front pay is a permanent substitute for reinstatement,
the court may rely on the expert testimony provided to estimate a
lump-sum amount of front pay at the time of judgment, reflecting
reduction to present value. Whatever method is chosen, courts
should not be hindered by the seeming lack of presumptive enti-
261lement to front pay. Instead, courts should focus on fashioning
the most complete and fair remedy possible from the broad range
of remedial measures available.26
259. See id.; see also Willis v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 749 F. Supp. 923, 924
(E.D. Ark. 1990) (awarding front pay on a monthly basis until suitable position be-
came available).
260. See Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d Cir.
1996) (upholding 23 years of front pay compensation to victim of unlawful demo-
tion in violation of the ADEA). Because the plaintiff had worked on the rails for
more than 20 years, he had obtained specialized skills, but lacked the higher edu-
cation necessary to find a job that would pay a comparable salary. See id. at 124.
The plaintiff was awarded front pay equal to the difference between the salary af-
ter the unlawful demotion and the salary of the rightful place position until he
reached his pension when he is 67 years old. See id.
261. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1046
(N.D. Ala. 1973); see also BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.23. The theory behind red
circling is that the victim should not bear the cost of remedying the employer's
past discriminatory practices. See id.
262. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1189 (2d Cir. 1992)
(affirming award of $667,000 of front pay after reduction for present value). In
Tyler, expert testimony was presented as to expected income, future work-life and
the possibility of earnings from other employment. See id. The amount awarded
was to cover an expected work-life of 17 years, with each year averaging substan-
tially less than the victim had been making. See id.
263. See BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.5. Discussing the fact that the Albemarle
presumptive entitlement rule is applied to back pay and reinstatement, but is
rarely discussed in connection with front pay, even though it seems equally appli-
cable. See id.
264. Cf Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984)
("[Front pay] is but one of a broad range of remedial measures available under
the ADEA"); see also BELTON, supra note 170, § 10.5.
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V. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment carries substantial costs to individuals, em-
ployers, and society. The development of sexual harassment as a
Title VII violation has no precise statutory mooring. Rather, it is
the courts that have made sexual harassment legally actionable
conduct. Having originated as a piecemeal administrative and ju-
dicial construct, the legal status of sexual harassment continues to
develop as a patchwork of judicial opinions, and it is therefore sub-
ject to judicial change.
Title VII was enacted to eliminate prevailing sexist prejudices
and sexual stereotypes from the workplace. However, the imposi-
tion of additional "elements" necessary to prove a case of sexual
harassment suggest that such prejudices and stereotypes are still
present, not only in the workplace, but in the judiciary as well.
Congress clearly intended the language of Title VII to be read
broadly in order to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination in em-
ployment and to fully compensate its victims. Yet, courts have been
painfully slow to grant the full range of remedies available to suc-
cessful plaintiffs, deferring, instead, to judicially created prefer-
ences with no statutory mandate. While it is understandable that
courts wish to guard against making windfall awards to victims, it is
a far greater atrocity to allow an employer, who has been found to
have violated Title VII, to dictate the terms of the victim's recovery.
Front pay can be an effective tool for meeting the dual objec-
tives of Title VII by serving to make the victim of discrimination
whole and by deterring the employer from future discriminatory
conduct. While front pay may not be appropriate in every case, it
should be given the same presumptive consideration as reinstate-
ment when the court elects to fashion a prospective remedy.
Courts have been granted the necessary discretionary authority
to establish a fair and equitable process and result for individuals
litigating sexual harassment cases. This authority must continue to
manifest itself in case law that reflects the ever-evolving nature of
the workplace and grants victims of sexual harassment the totality
of rights, protections, and remedies provided by Title VII.
Elizabeth Papacek
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